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AS THE DEPRESSION DEEPENED, a majority of the HughesCourt, committed to an economic policy of laissez-faire, proceeded
to frustrate the legislative policies of President Roosevelt in a series
of controversial cases in which Justice Cardozo participated. A direct
confrontation between the executive and judicial powers was thereby
precipitated when, in 1937, the President submitted a Supreme Court
reorganization proposal to the United States Congress.
Ominous indications of impending division within the Court made
undisguised appearances during the early months of 1934 when the
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law was declared valid in Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell.' Not long thereafter, in Nebbia
v. New York,2 the New York Milk Control Law was also sustained.
In both cases, Justices Cardozo, Stone, and Brandeis joined in a
majority coalition with Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts.
Although neither case constituted a part of the New Deal legislation
later invalidated by the Court, both cases did, however, give determined
expression to opposing ideals of constitutional interpretation.
Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court in Blaisdell, held the
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law constitutional. Significantly,
the Chief Justice was willing to examine the exercise of state police
power in the broad perspective necessitated by the depression. Although
an emergency does not create power, an emergency may explain and
justify the use of power not before invoked. Relying on this explanation
of the state's action, the Court found no unauthorized extension of
state police power contrary to the contract clause in the Federal
Constitution.
t Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri - Kansas
City, B.A., M.A., J.D., Ph.D., University of Iowa.
The author is especially grateful to Professor Joseph Tanenhaus of the Depart-
ment of Political Science of The State University of New York at Stony Brook for
his helpful commentary on an earlier draft of this article.
1. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
2. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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The sanctity of contract, supposedly rendered inviolate by consti-
tutional provision, was, by the minority view, fundamentally at issue.
In a passage akin to a Victorian morality lesson, Justice Sutherland
enunciated in its classic form the doctrine of laissez-faire.
The present exigency is nothing new. From the beginning
of our existence as a nation, periods of depression, of industrial
failure, of financial distress, of unpaid and unpayable indebtedness,
have alternated with years of plenty. The vital lesson that expendi-
ture beyond income begets poverty, that public or private extra-
vagance, financed by promises to pay, either must end in complete
or partial repudiation or the promises be fulfilled by self-denial
and painful effort, though constantly taught by bitter experience,
seems never to be learned; and the attempt by legislative devices
to shift the misfortune of the debtor to the shoulders of the
creditor without coming into conflict with the contract impairment
clause has been persistent and oft-repeated.3
In Nebbia, where a storekeeper's conviction under a penal provi-
sion of the contested New York price-fixing legislation was affirmed,
Justice Roberts' opinion was taken by some observers as an indication
of his basic alliance with the Cardozo group. Two sentences in Nebbia
were singularly in accord with Justice Cardozo's constitutional juris-
prudence. "And it is equally clear that if the legislative policy be to
curb unrestrained and harmful competition by measures which are not
arbitrary or discriminatory it does not lie with the courts to determine
that the rule is unwise. With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with
the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the
courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal."4
In his Nebbia dissent, Justice McReynolds, joined by Justices
Sutherland, Van Devanter, and Butler, expressed displeasure with
Chief Justice Hughes' reasoning in the earlier Blaisdell decision. "The
theory that legislative action which ordinarily would be ineffective
because of conflict with the Constitution may become potent if intended
to meet peculiar conditions and properly limited, was lucidly discussed
and its weakness disclosed by the dissenting opinion in Home Building
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell."' With a significance not fully appreciated
when the dissent was first announced, Justice McReynolds had truly
foretold of things to come. That doctrine of judicial restraint, founded
on skepticism and sustained by humility in the person of Mr. Justice
Holmes and later gracefully restated in the opinions and jurisprudential
3. 290 U.S. at 471-72.
4. 291 U.S. at 537.
5. Id. at 544-45.
FALL 1969]
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writings of Benjamin N. Cardozo, had far to go until it was to find
strong acceptance, for even a little while, in the United States
Supreme Court.6
The Rise of National Power
Statistically, Justices Cardozo and Stone supported the ever-in-
creasing extension of national power during the early nineteen-thirties
more frequently than did other members of the Hughes Court, even
though they still refused to support the government's position in a
substantial number of cases.
The principal cases and the complex economic circumstances which
attended them have been examined at length by many commentators.,
However, little attention has been directed to the cases represented
in Table I with primary emphasis placed on Justice Cardozo's role
in these decisions. Although condemnors of the Hughes Court have
over the years hastened to vilify the Court for its opposition to the
legislation held invalid in Table I, an examination of the cases will
indicate in specific terms Justice Cardozo's generally favorable reaction
to the policies of the New Deal in so far as they involved an extension
of national power within the limits of the Constitution.
In a letter written to his cousin, Maud Nathan, Justice Cardozo
commented on his dissent in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.8 "I think
I have had more glory out of my lone dissent than out of all my
majority opinions. But lone dissents are not unusual. Holmes made
them a habit, unless my memory is playing me tricks. The same day
that I filled the solitary role, Stone was the sole dissenter in another
case. The only difference was that mine was in the public eye." 9
Early in 1935, the Supreme Court in Panama Refining Co. de-
clared section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconsti-
tutional. Section 9(c) had authorized the President to prohibit inter-
state oil shipments if the oil had been produced in violation of a state's
production quota. Violations of section 9(c) were indictable as a
federal misdemeanor. Chief Justice Hughes, who wrote the Court's
opinion, was especially troubled by the alleged absence of an express
statutory standard circumscribing the delegation of power to the
President. The Court was apparently unwilling to acquiesce to a
6. See generally Atkinson, Mr. Justice Cardozo on the Supreme Court: State
and Federal Taxation, 5 HousToN L. Rpv. 254 (1967); Mendelson, Mr. Justice
Holmes - Humility, Skepticism and Democracy, 36 MINN. L. Rzv. 343 (1952).
7. See generally R. JACKSON, THe STRUGGL8 VOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941) ;
A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN (1958); Stern, The Com-
merce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARv. L. Rzv. 645, 883 (1946).
8. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
9. G. HELLMAN, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO 293 (1940).
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Table I
ACTS OF CONGRESS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL DURING
1931-1937 TERMS: CARDOZO, J., PARTICIPATING*
Justice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
STONE + + + +
CARDOZO + + + - +







Legend: +: vote for constitutionality; -: vote against constitutionality.
* Comments on cases taken from S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 46 (1937).
1. Railroad Retirement Act; R.R. Retirement Board v. Alton Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
2. Guffey Coal Act; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) ; Note: Justices
Stone, Cardozo, Brandeis, and Chief Justice Hughes dissented in part.
3. Agricultural Adjustment Act; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), pro-
vision relating to agricultural processing taxes held void.
4. Gold Clause Resolution; Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), held void
Section I of said act insofar as applicable to gold clause in Government obligations
(but recovery was denied because plaintiff did not show damages). Note: Eight
Justices concurred in holding the statute unconstitutional - Chief Justice Hughes,
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, Roberts, and
Cardozo; but Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and
Cardozo held that the petitioner was not entitled to recover in the suit because he
had suffered no damage; while Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland,
and Butler dissented on this point. Justice Stone dissented on the ground that,
while he concurred with a majority of the Court in holding that the petitioner was
not entitled to recover in the suit, because of failure to show any damage, he
thought it "unnecessary and undesirable for the Court to undertake to say that the
obligation of the gold clause in Government bonds is greater than in bonds f
private individuals or that, in some manner and in some measure undefined, it has
imposed restrictions upon the future exercise of the power to regulate the cur-
rency .... There is no occasion now to resolve the doubts which I entertain with
respect to these questions." He stated, therefore, that he did not join in so much
of the opinion as held the act unconstitutional.
5. National Industrial Recovery Act, Section 9 (c) ; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935), held void Section 9 (c) of the National Industrial Recovery
Act which dealt with "hot oil."
6. Independent Offices Appropriation Act; Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339(1934), held void the provision of the bill reducing pay of federal judges.
7. Economy Act, 1933; Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), held void the
provisions of said act which repealed all laws granting or pertaining to yearly
renewable term insurance.
8. National Industrial Recovery Act, Section 3; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. V.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), held void provisions of said act relating
to codes.
9. Frazier-Lemke Bankruptcy Act; Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
10. Amended Home Owners' Loan Corp. Act; Hopkins Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315
(1935), held void Section 5 (i) providing for the conversion of state loan asso-
ciations into federal associations upon vote of 51 per cent of votes cast.
11. Agricultural Adjustment Act Amendments; Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 297
U.S. 110 (1936).
12. Municipal Bankruptcy Act; Ashton v. Cameron Water Imp. Co., 298 U.S. 513(1936), readjusting of indebtedness by political subdivisions of states.
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Congressional delegation of power to the President in the absence
of a prescribed standard of presidential conduct.
Although there is no persuasive reason why delegations cannot
be validly entered into without express standards,"0 Justice Cardozo
assumed in his lone dissent, as did the majority, that a valid con-
gressional delegation of legislative power must be subject to ascertain-
able limitations. Justice Cardozo, however, discovered a reasonably
unambiguous standard governing the President's discretion by looking
to the enactment in its entirety. Section 9(c) applied to only petroleum
transported in interstate commerce contrary to regulations prescribed
by state law. The President was "not left to roam at will among all
the possible subjects of interstate transportation, picking and choosing
as he pleases."" Even though Justice Cardozo was content to abide
with the traditional insistence on the presence of standards regulating
the activities of the recipient of the power delegated, he was not inclined
to view this prerequisite narrowly. He was, instead, prepared to infer
the existence of a standard from the legislation, much as a judge
deciding a question of contract law might, in the absence of specific
language, find an implied promise of consideration in an otherwise
complete contract sufficiently definite to sustain its validity. Broadly
illustrative of Justice Cardozo's thought in the instant case was his
dictum in the New York decision involving the celebrated Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon.
The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the
precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal.
It takes a broader view to-day. A promise may be lacking, and
yet the whole writing may be "instinct with an obligation,"
imperfectly expressed. 2
So viewed, the delegation of power under section 9(c) was re-
stricted by the context of the legislation which gave rise to the delega-
tion in the first instance. Despite its vagueness, a standard emerged
certain enough to sustain the presumption of constitutionality. In
memorable language, Justice Cardozo advised the Court:
There is no fear that the nation will drift from its ancient
moorings as the result of the narrow delegation of power permitted
by this section. What can be done under cover of that permission
is closely and clearly circumscribed both as to subject matter and
occasion. The statute was framed in the shadow of a national
disaster. A host of unforeseen contingencies would have to be
10. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TcXT 31-52 (1959).
11. 293 U.S. at 434.
12. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91 (1917).
[VOL. 15 : p. 68
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faced from day to day, and faced with a fullness of understanding
unattainable by any one except the man upon the scene. The
President was chosen to meet the instant need."3
Implicit in Justice Cardozo's dissent was an awareness of the obstacles
encountered by the drafters of the invalid legislation. Had the drafters
been too precise in stating the terms of the delegation, the statute would
not improbably have been unconstitutional as arbitrary and unreason-
able. But since the drafters had been imprecise in stating the terms
of the delegation, the statute was unconstitutional as an excessive and
improper delegation of congressional power.
Some years later, Justice Cardozo spoke candidly about Justice
Brandeis' vote in Panama Refining Co. to Robert Marshall, then a
promising young government official assigned to the Forestry Division.
Justice Cardozo believed that Justice Brandeis had voted against the
validity of section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act
"because delegation of power didn't fit in his pattern. Brandeis
has thought out a pattern for the whole universe and he has a niche
into which every fact fits." After a moment's pause he added, almost
as an afterthought, "Holmes didn't see any pattern to the universe."' 4
The next major national legislation to come before the Court was
the Joint Congressional Resolution of June 5, 1933, which declared the
standard gold clauses, then generally found in credit contracts at the
creditor's behest, void as against public policy. The purpose of the legis-
lation was to lessen the drain on the national gold supply; further, Con-
gress intended to devalue all money and obligations outstanding in the
country and to thereby protect the debtor class. This change in mone-
tary policy also benefited many persons of wealth with interests in com-
mercial institutions which depended on credit and heavy borrowing."
In opinions delivered by Chief Justice Hughes, the government's
position was upheld in three of the four Gold Clause cases. With
respect to its own obligations, the Court held that Congress had
exceeded its authority to act.'" Technical rules of damage were then
found applicable. A recovery to the petitioner which would have set
a catastrophic precedent in terms of the national economy was thereby
disallowed. Justice Cardozo reportedly assured Chief Justice Hughes
he was "100 per cent right" in his view that the Congress could not
constitutionally invalidate the gold clause obligations in bonds issued
by the federal government.7
13. 293 U.S. at 443-44.
14. G. HELLMAN, supra note 9, at 254.
15. See generally R. JACKSON, supra note 7, at 96-104.
16. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
17. 2 M. PusEY, CHAPLEs EVANS HUGHES 737 (1951).
FALL 1969]
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Justice McReynolds' dissent warned of "loss of reputation for
honorable dealing" which would bring the country "unending humilia-
tion." "[T]he impending legal and moral chaos," he complained,
"is appalling."' 8
On May 6, 1935, Justice Roberts unexpectedly took company
with Justices Sutherland, Van Devanter, Butler, and McReynolds and
declared the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 unconstitutional in an
opinion markedly sweeping in its castigation of the controversial
legislation. 9 Chief Justice Hughes was compelled to register a sharp
dissent with which Justices Cardozo, Stone, and Brandeis concurred.
The majority was not content with merely objecting to those severable
portions of the act which conceivably could have been remedied by
further legislation. Instead, the majority denounced the constitutional
propriety of any compulsory pension act for railroad employees. It was
not in itself extraordinary that Justice Roberts had voted with the
four Justices generally opposed to New Deal legislation; it was extra-
ordinary that he had worded the opinion as he did. Although the
Railroad Retirement Act was not a New Deal measure specifically,
it was New Deal in purpose and in spirit. And yet, even the vehemence
with which the Court rejected the Railroad Retirement Act left few
informed persons completely prepared for the decisions delivered on
the Monday of May 27, 1935.
On that day, at the stroke of twelve, page boys as usual parted
the velvet curtains, the Justices filed silently into the courtroom, and
the three unanimous decisions repudiating the Roosevelt Administra-
tion were announced to a stunned audience.
The news of the Court's decisions was hurried to the White House
and President Roosevelt's first demand was "Where was Brandeis?"
When informed that Justice Brandeis had voted with the majority, an
astonished President next inquired, "Where was Cardozo? Where
was Stone?"20 Justice Cardozo had joined with the rest of the Court
to declare the Blue Eagle and the Frazier-Lemke Acts invalid, and in
the third case Chief Justice Taft's broad interpretation of the President's
removal power had been severely restricted.
Before the decisions were delivered, Chief Justice Hughes had
taken counsel with Justice Brandeis and had inquired of him whether
it would be wise to rebuke the Administration in three cases on the
same day. Justice Brandeis had replied that he was unaware of any
reason for altering the scheduled delivery of the opinions. Justice
Brandeis did not later change his mind. He always maintained that
18. 294 U.S. 330, 381 (1935).
19. R.R. Retirement Board v. Alton Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
20. See 2 M. Pusjy, supra note 17, at 742.
[VOL. 15 : p. 68
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May 27th was "the most important day in the history of the Court
and the most beneficent." 21
The first decision announced on May 27th, A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States,2 12 involved section 3 of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, which authorized a code of fair competition
thereafter promulgated by the President. The Live Poultry Code,
drafted under the authority of section 3, purported to regulate the
poultry industry in an extensive manner, including inter alia the deter-
mination of hours, wages, and trade practices. In the Court's opinion,
Chief Justice Hughes found this delegation of power to the President
invalid and further indicated, in sweeping language, the inadvisibility
of using the commerce clause as a basis for emergency legislation if
the intrastate transaction only "indirectly" affected interstate commerce.
Even though he concurred in the Court's result, Justice Cardozo
elected to make explicit his own reasoning. He objected specifically
to the Live Poultry Code as an illustration of "delegation running
riot."2 The Live Poultry Code, he concluded, "outruns the bounds
of the authority conferred. '2 Section 3 of the National Industrial
Recovery Act gave the President general authority to promulgate codes
of unfair competition; and yet, the Live Poultry Code was not con-
cerned with the issue of fair competition within the poultry industry.
An elaborate set of rules had been established to improve the welfare
of the industry, but they were largely unrelated to oppressive or un-
ethical business conduct. For example, Justice Cardozo was disturbed
by the Code's provision which prohibited the selective buying of
poultry, an established practice which was neither unethical nor oppres-
sive. In a word, Congress had authorized the President to deal with
unfair trade practices, but the Live Poultry Code established regulatory
guidelines which very nearly brought within its penumbra the total
activities of the poultry industry.
Neither did Justice Cardozo accede to the regulation of wages
and hours in such part of the petitioner's business as was involved in
interstate transactions. The recognition of a basis for wage and hour
regulations under the interstate commerce clause would obfuscate any
meaningful distinction between activities purely local and those of
national significance, so completely were the petitioner's activities
centralized in New York state.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Learned Hand, had previously affirmed the government's posi-
21. A. MAsoN, BRANDEIS 620 (1946).
22. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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tion in Schechter. In an unforgetable paragraph in his Schechter
opinion, Justice Cardozo stayed to take issue with the court below.
As is so often true in the law, although the issue before the Court
seemed small and insignificant, questions of imposing significance were
present, only partially concealed in the opinion. Here the smaller
matter considered by Judge Hand and Justice Cardozo was whether
the President had been given sufficient authority by section 3 of the
National Industrial Recovery Act to regulate the poultry industry
by means of the Live Poultry Code. Congressional authority to act
under the commerce clause is restricted to interstate commerce among
the several states, and Congress has no delegated power to act with
respect to intrastate commerce, local in kind, which does not affect
interstate transactions. What, then, constitutes local commerce and
what is required before commerce becomes subject to the regulation of
the national government? This question, as Judge Hand and Justice
Cardozo perceived it, goes to the very essense of federalism. Justice
Cardozo took notice of the presence of a view which "would obliterate
'the distinction between what is national and what is local in the
activities of commerce." 25 Concerned with the importance of this
distinction, and wishing to elaborate its implications, Justice Cardozo
enlarged upon Judge Hand's metaphorical use of vibration to illustrate
his thought: "Motion at the outer rim is communicated perceptibly,
though minutely, to recording instruments at the center. A society such
as ours 'is an elastic medium which transmits all tremors throughout
its territory; the only question is of their size.' "26 Although Justice
Cardozo agreed with Judge Hand that the law's concern is very often
with considerations of degree and not of kind (as was thought by the
Chief Justice when he relied on a supposed distinction between "direct"
and "indirect" affects on interstate commerce), he interpreted the
legal seismograph differently than did Judge Hand in the instant case.
With only the mildest suggestion of correction, Justice Cardozo ob-
served, "activities local in their immediacy do not become interstate
and national because of distant repercussions." He then concluded:
"If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the exclusion of the forces
that oppose and counteract them, there will be an end to our federal
system. '2
7
The scale, therefore, must not be misread to the advantage of
the national government of delegated powers, and powers exercised
beyond the limits of an expressed delegation are powers exercised ultra
25. Id. at 554.
26. Id.
27. Id.
[VOL. 15 : p. 68
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vires. Unless the scale is kept on balance, federalism cannot over time
be maintained. The question of the desirability of federalism is, of
course, a question distinct and apart from the question of its preserva-
tion. In the instant case, Justice Cardozo was unwilling to acquiesce
in an extension of national power which he found unauthorized by the
Constitution. In controversies over the respective provinces of state
and national power, as in other questions of degree, he was inclined
to pursue the middle way.
The opinion in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,2"
which declared the Frazier-Lemke Act unconstitutional, was delivered
by Justice Brandeis. The Frazier-Lemke Act, a particularly improvi-
dent piece of legislation, was drafted for the benefit of farm debtors.
It was, however, patently class legislation which transferred property
from creditor to debtor in the absence of any larger public interest.
Most incredibly, the Frazier-Lemke Act failed to provide any remedial
procedures whereby the creditor could redeem his interests with the
coming of improved economic conditions. If, in fact, a larger public
interest was involved, as alleged by the Administration, the exercise
of the right of eminent domain was the proper procedure whereby the
property should have been confiscated. For, in that case, the burden
of the relief would have been borne equally by all through taxation;
the procedures adopted by the Frazier-Lemke Act would arbitrarily
have discriminated against the creditor class, who might with least
equity be made to bear their full financial loss.
The third opinion of the day, Humphrey's Executor v. United
States,29 written by Justice Sutherland, sharply cut back into the broad
implications of Myers v. United States,"° where Chief Justice Taft had
implied that .the President's power of removal was an inherent corollary
of his power of appointment, and especially so when the appointee had
failed to wisely execute the duties entrusted to his discretion. To hold
otherwise, Chief Justice Taft had insisted, would prevent the President
from insuring the faithful execution of the laws charged to his re-
sponsibility under the Constitution. In Humphrey's Executor, one
William E. Humphrey, a Hoover appointee to the Federal Trade
Commission, was in President Roosevelt's estimation strikingly in-
competent in his official capacity;31 however, the President assigned
political disagreement as his motive for requesting the appointee's
removal.32 The President's request was sound in the light of Chief
28. 295 U.S. 555 (1935). For an excellent discussion, see A. MASON, supra note
21, at 619.
29. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
30. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
31. See R. JACKSON, supra note 7, at 107.
32. Id. at 107-09.
FALL 1969]
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss1/3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Justice Taft's dictum in Myers. Nonetheless, the Court refused to
acknowledge a shift away from Myers and, instead, strongly implied
the appointee had been unconsciously wronged in a manner prohibited
by the Constitution. Taken solely as a methodological illustration of
appellate decision-making, the Humphrey's case was difficult to defend.
Taken as substantive doctrine, the opinion was more defensible. The
Federal Trade Commission, when established, was purposefully non-
partisan. Whether or not President Roosevelt agreed or disagreed
with Mr. Humphrey's judgment in matters affecting the Federal Trade
Commission was irrelevant. Justice Cardozo found no reason to depart
from the Court's judgment, even though the opinion lacked ordinary
judicial diplomacy. The dictum in Myers on which the President
relied should have been expressly disapproved or else strictly limited
to the facts there involved.
Although he refused to view the province of national power with
overexact restrictiveness, Justice Cardozo was, in the instance of the
amended Home Owners' Loan Corporation Act, persuaded that Con-
gress had overreached into an area pre-empted by the reserved powers
of the states. Justice Cardozo's opinion in Hopkins Federal Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. Cleary,88 written for an unanimous Court, disallowed
the conversion of building and loan associations incorporated under
state law into federal institutions when conversion was expressly pro-
hibited by state law. Noticeable in Cleary was the caution with which
Justice Cardozo drafted the opinion. The dictum was circumspect
and the holding no broader than was necessary for the disposition of
the case.
Confining ourselves now to the precise and narrow question
presented upon the records here before us, we hold that the con-
version of petitioners from state into federal associations is of
no effect when voted against the protest of Wisconsin. Beyond
that we do not go. No question is here as to the scope of the war
power or of the power of eminent domain or of the power to
regulate transactions affecting interstate or foreign commerce. The
effect of these, if they have any, upon the powers reserved by the
Constitution to the states or to the people will be considered
when the need arises.
84
There was here no evidence of hostility towards the legitimate exercise
of national power; there was, however, clear insistence on the need
for justifying extraordinary national legislation affecting the states on
a basis provided in the Constitution. The amended Home Owners'
Loan Act was an attempt by Congress to exercise broad general powers
33. 296 U.S. 315 (1935).
34. Id. at 343.
[VOL.. 15 : p. 68
11
Atkinson: Mr. Justice Cardozo and the New Deal: An Appraisal
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO AND THE NEW DEAL
affecting quasi-public corporations permitted by the state to conduct
business in furtherance of its public policy. The legislation was held
unconstitutional because it had not been justified within any of the
powers specifically delegated to Congress by the Constitution. In
Cleary, the national government attempted to disregard Wisconsin
law which was expressly contrary to the provisions of the amended
Home Owners' Loan Act. Legislation which would have infringed
on the quasi-sovereignty of the states was beyond the range of con-
gressional power: Congress had failed to invoke a constitutional
grant of power sufficient to its task.
The days of December 9th and 10th, 1935, were reserved for
argument in the case of United States v. Butler, 5 with the constitu-
tionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act at issue. The govern-
ment's position was stated by Solicitor General Stanley Reed in an
unemotional and straightforward presentation which emphasized the
emergency conditions which had prompted the legislation. Mr. Reed
was followed by the very distinguished George Wharton Pepper of
the Philadelphia Bar, whose flamboyant oratory had, in an earlier
time, marked his career in the United States Senate. The stentorian
effectiveness of his style had, if anything, improved with the passing
of years. Not since Joseph H. Choate's oration in Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co.," had the Court been party to a plea of similar
strength.
I do not want your Honors to think that my feelings are not
involved, and that my emotions are not deeply stirred. Indeed,
may it please your Honors, I believe I am standing here today
to plead the cause of the America I have loved; and I pray Al-
mighty God that not in my time may "the land of the regimented"
be accepted as a worthy substitute for "the land of the free.""7
Although the majority held the Agricultural Adjustment Act
invalid, Justices Cardozo and Brandeis joined in Justice Stone's dissent.
With a reminder to the majority that "[c]ourts are not the only
agency of government that must be assumed to have capacity to
govern,"3" Justice Stone's dissent emphasized the distinction between
judging the wisdom of an act of Congress (which the Court cannot
do) and determining whether Congress has in a given case exceeded
its power to act.3 9
35. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
36. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
37. 297 U.S. 1, 44 (1936).
38. Id. at 87.
39. In a memorandum dated February 4, 1936, Justice Stone revealed that in
conference Justice Cardozo had contented himself with a remark to the effect that he
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The Government was equally unsuccessful in Jones v. Securities
Exchange Comm'n,4° where Justice Sutherland went beyond the stat-
utory construction question presented by the facts. Jones had filed
a registration statement before the SEC; the Commission had ques-
tioned the accuracy of his statement, and had then subpoenaed him
to produce his private files. Thereupon, Jones withdrew his registra-
tion statement and argued that the Commission's right of investiga-
tion had, with his withdrawal, been terminated. The Court agreed
with the petitioner, and thereupon took the occasion to castigate the
SEC with some harshness. Joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone,
Justice Cardozo filed a significant dissent. Justice Sutherland's charge
of arbitrary and irresponsible inquiry by the Commission was at once
rejected. "Nothing in the case gives color to the argument that the
witness was to be subjected to a roving examination without the
restraints of pleadings or bounds analogous thereto."'
Justice Cardozo's dissent in Jones is alive with suspicion of the
petitioner's wrong-doing in the telling of untruths or half truths. Few
jurists have been as conscious of the importance of ethics in the affairs
of business. Perhaps his father's unethical conduct on the New York
Supreme Court, which eventually led to his resignation, influenced
him more than he may ever have realized.42 Whatever the importance
of his family's past, it can be recorded with certainty that Justice
Cardozo would tolerate no compromise with complete and honest
disclosure in business dealings. Wrongs committed or attempted, he
insisted in Jones, "must be dragged to light and pilloried," else the
Securities and Exchange Commission Act be made "the sport of clever
knaves . . . intent upon obscuring or suppressing the knowledge of
their knavery. ' 43
Two opinions which further restricted the exercise of national
power, and from which Justice Cardozo dissented, were delivered in
the spring of 1936. The Court's majority, in an opinion by Justice
Sutherland, held the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, more popularly
known as the Guffey Coal Bill, unconstitutional in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co.,44 and the Municipal Bankruptcy Act was found unconstitutional
agreed with what Justice Stone had said. Justice Cardozo apparently had nothing
more to say regarding the case after Justice Stone had stated his views. Immediately
before Justice Stone had stated his position, Justice Brandeis had passed without
comment. See A. MASON, HARLAN FISKV STNi 414-15 (1956).
40. 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
41. Id. at 29.
42. For details, see G. HSLLMAN, supra note 9, at 10-11.
43. 298 U.S. at 32-33.
44. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist.,"5 in an
opinion delivered by Justice McReynolds.
In Carter, Justice Cardozo was satisfied that the Act was "within
the power of the central government in so far as it provides for mini-
mum and maximum prices upon sales of bituminous coal in the
transactions of interstate commerce and in those of intrastate commerce
where interstate commerce is directly or intimately affected." '4 6 The
Act, however, contained provisions affecting labor relations within
the coal industry which the Court considered invalid; consequently,
the entire Act was condemned as unconstitutional, including the price-
fixing provisions. The invalid provisions were not considered sever-
able from the rest of the Act even though the Act contained a clause
which stated Congress' intention that invalid provisions be condemned
apart from the rest of the Act. Justice Cardozo considered the price-
fixing provisions valid; the other sections had not been implemented
and, hence, their constitutionality was not properly before the Court.
"To adopt a homely form of words," said Justice Cardozo, "the
complainants have been crying before they are really hurt." '4 7
When the Supreme Court held the Municipal Bankruptcy Act
unconstitutional, Chief Justice Hughes, as well as Justices Stone and
Brandeis, joined in Justice Cardozo's dissent. The Act had 'been
drafted to permit debt-ridden municipal corporations an opportunity
to compromise their obligations, with the permission of the major
creditors. Only those municipalities duly authorized by state law
could avail themselves of the relief permitted in the federal courts
under the Municipal Bankruptcy Act. Hence, the Act was inapplicable
to any municipality if two prerequisites were not satisfied: 1) state
law had to authorize municipal participation and 2) major creditors
had to consent to an equitable compromise. It was, therefore, not
completely accurate for the Court to conclude the Act constituted an
invasion of the fiscal prerogatives of the states. Further, the same
objection was made with respect to the rights of the municipalities.
A question of sovereignty under the Constitution was at issue. A
position at odds with the majority was carefully expressed in dissent.
"In the public law of the United States a state is a sovereign or at
least a quasi-sovereign. Not so, a local governmental unit, though a
state may have invested it with governmental power."4 The munici-
palities were without sovereignty and their position as a governmental
unit was not compromised; in truth, the legislation was designed to
45. 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
46. 298 U.S. at 325.
47. Id. at 341.
48. 298 U.S. 513, at 542 (1936).
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assist municipal corporations at their option. The Municipal Bank-
ruptcy Act, by the better view, was less an extension of national power
than an attempted implementation of national responsibility.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has illustrated three aspects of Justice
Cardozo's reaction to the broadened exercise of national power under
the Roosevelt Administration. First, Justice Cardozo had no sympathy
for doctrinaire laissez-faire economic theory. Unlike Justices Suther-
land, Van Devanter, Butler, and McReynolds, but like Justice Holmes
before him, Justice Cardozo entertained the view that "a constitution
is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of
laissez-faire."9 Second, Justice Cardozo was aware of the federal
government's responsibility to the nation; in an economic crisis of
unparalleled dimensions, direction and leadership in the arduous process
of national recovery could not for light or transient cause be frustrated
by judicial fiat. Even before his appointment to the Supreme Court,
Justice Cardozo had observed that cases are not decided in a vacuum
devoid of economic and political realities: "Courts know today that
statutes are to be viewed, not in isolation or in vacuo, as pronounce-
ments of abstract principles for the guidance of an ideal community,
but in the setting and the framework of present-day conditions, as
revealed by the labors of economists and students of the social sciences
in our own country and abroad. ' 50 Third, Justice Cardozo, like Justices
Stone and Brandeis, did not enthusiastically support the Government's
position in most of the cases in which national legislation was declared
invalid. However, as his opinions clearly indicate, it was not the
spirit or intent behind the legislation with which Justice Cardozo was
prone to disagree. It was, rather, hastily drafted or improvidently
considered legislation which was apt to find his disfavor. "A constitu-
tion," he once wrote, "states or ought to state not rules for the passing
hour, but principles for an expanding future.""' He was, as one might
expect, unwilling to compromise the structure of constitutional govern-
ment in the United States because of considerations of expediency
demanded by the passing hour. Broad national power could be exer-
cised under the authority of the Constitution, but the power so
exercised had, as always, to find ultimate justification in the delegating
provisions of the Constitution.
49. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905). See also B. CARDozo, Tut
NATURE Olt THZ JUDICIAL PRocgss 79 (1921).
50. B. CARDOZO, supra note 49, at 81.
51. Id. at 83.
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